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Abstract 
The main objective of this thesis is to investigate the economic effects of imposing the value 
added tax (VAT) on financial services. 
Over the past decades a strong debate has been going on whether the VAT should and 
especially could be imposed on the financial services that traditionally have been exempt 
from it.  The exemption seems to be widely perceived as undesirable because of the number 
of important distortions that it leads to. At the same time, the administrative and technical 
difficulties associated with imposing the VAT on financial services have been preventing 
many countries from making changes in the existing VAT treatment of the financial sector. 
There is also a number of theoretical arguments in favor of the exemption. Some economists 
take a step back from the implementation problems and pose a question whether the financial 
services should be taxed at all. The main argument against introducing the VAT on financial 
services is that the tax might create additional distortions, for example distortions in 
households’ consumption vs. saving decisions as a result of change in relative price of 
saving.  
Nevertheless, many countries seem to recognize that the distortions associated with the VAT 
exemption of financial services are much more important to deal with than the ones that 
might potentially occur when the exemption is lifted. The only issue that no country has 
managed to fully overcome yet is the technical and administrative complexity of imposing 
the VAT on margin-based financial services.  
In the tax literature we find various proposals on how the issue of technical complexity 
associated with applying the VAT on financial services can be solved. In the model presented 
in this thesis I use two of the proposed methods, namely the Cash-Flow Method and the 
Option to Tax. I set up and solve a two-period consumption-investment model, where a 
monopolistic bank supplies intermediation services between borrowers (firms) and lenders 
(households). I incorporate both cash-flow taxation and option to tax into the model as 
possible solutions to the issue of technical and administrative complexity of taxation of 
financial services. In particular, I compare two cases: with and without VAT on financial 
services, using the latter as a benchmark for the analysis. I show that in the benchmark case 
the market solution to the optimization problem leads to a marginal welfare loss, measured by 
the deviation of the market solution from the social optimum. Applying the VAT on financial 
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services brings the market allocation closer to the socially optimal allocation, thus reducing 
the marginal welfare loss in the economy. This becomes possible due to the input VAT 
rebates that the firms are entitled to when the exemption is lifted. The marginal welfare loss 
will always be smaller when the VAT is imposed, as long as the probability of opting in is 
positive.  
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1 Introduction 
The value added tax is the most common form of the indirect taxation in many countries, 
which generally applies to all final consumption. There are, however, some groups of goods 
and services that are exempt from VAT. Among them is a wide range of financial services, 
such as insurance, intermediation services between lenders and borrowers, payment 
transactions, etc. The exemption implies two things: first, the suppliers of financial services 
are not allowed to charge VAT on such services; and second, the suppliers of financial 
services do not receive credit for the VAT paid on inputs used in the production of such 
services.  
Over the last decades an intense debate has been going on whether the value added tax should 
and especially could be imposed on the financial services that traditionally have been exempt 
from it.  On the one hand, the exemption seems to be generally perceived as undesirable, as it 
causes a number of important economic distortions and violates the neutrality of the VAT-
system. On the other hand, the administrative and technical difficulties of taxing financial 
services have made the exemption to be settled upon as the only feasible alternative. Such 
technical difficulties arise from the fact that many financial services are priced implicitly, 
which makes it problematic to define their “correct” value added. There is also a number of 
theoretical arguments in favor of the VAT exemption of the financial sector.  
The value added tax is recognized to be one of the main sources of public finance, meaning 
that the revenues from VAT are widely used for public consumption and investment, as well 
as public transfers. The growth of financial sector in many countries has been rapidly 
increasing. For instance, the financial sector in the U.S. has grown from 7.3% of GDP in 
1999 to 8.4% of GDP in 2007. In the UK the intermediation services have grown from 3,9% 
of GDP in 1970 up to 7,9% of GDP in 2005. The European Union’s financial sector has 
increased from 2.7% of GDP in 1970 to 5.5% in 2005 (Lockwood, 2010). Such trends in 
growth and development of financial sectors attract even more attention to the issue of VAT 
exemption of financial services. This attention is very often concentrated around the 
additional tax revenues that the VAT on financial services would contribute with. In Norway, 
for example, the expansion of the VAT to the financial sector is estimated to contribute to 
government revenues with about NOK 8 billion for 2014 (Norwegian Ministry of Finance, 
2013).  
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In designing the VAT system one should make certain that the tax on financial services 
neither results in worsening the distortions that are already present in the economy, nor 
contributes to creating new ones. These issues have been addressed in a number of theoretical 
works devoted to optimal taxation of financial services. Among them are papers by 
Lockwood (op. cit.), Boadway and Keen (2003), Chia and Walley (1999), Grubert and 
Mackie (1999), Jack (2000), and Auerbach and Gordon (2002). The authors of these works 
share the view that while taxation of explicitly priced financial services (for example, 
services paid for by fixed fees and commissions) is desirable and thus, should be 
implemented, the tax on implicitly priced services, such as financial intermediation services 
between borrowers and lenders, should remain zero. The main arguments behind this 
conclusion are that taxation of intermediation services imposes distortions on saving 
decisions (Jack, op. cit., Auerbach and Gordon, op. cit., Chia and Whalley, op. cit.), financial 
services are not final goods and thus should not be subject to a consumption tax (Grubet and 
Mackie, op. cit.), taxation of margin-based financial services leads to violation of the 
production efficiency theorem of Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) (Boadway and Keen, op. cit., 
Lockwood, op. cit.). 
One of the objectives of this master thesis is to examine these issues and show that financial 
services should be included into the VAT base. I set up a two-period consumption-investment 
model where a monopolistic bank supplies financial intermediation services between 
borrowers (firms) and lenders (households). In particular, I show that imposing VAT on 
margin-based financial services brings the market solution to the optimization problem closer 
to the one that is socially optimal.  
To address the issues of technical feasibility of the financial sector taxation, I use the cash-
flow approach in imposing VAT on financial services. Since it has been recognized that this 
approach is associated with large administrative and compliance costs, which could 
potentially become a severe burden for many financial institutions, I present a short overview 
on how such costs could be reduced, as well as introduce the option to tax into the model.  
The thesis is organized as follows. The next section discusses the distortions caused by VAT 
exemption of the financial services.  Section 3 presents the reasons behind financial sector 
VAT exemption. Section 4 outlines the main principles of the cash-flow approach, as well as 
some solutions to the issues associated with it. The main features of the option to tax-
proposal are described in section 5, while section 6 presents theoretical arguments supporting 
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the exemption. The model and its main results are presented in Section 7, while section 8 
discusses some incentive issues associated with the option to tax. Section 9 presents a short 
overview of the latest proposals on taxation of financial services in Norway. Section 10 
concludes. 
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2 Distortions caused by VAT exemption of 
the financial services 
It has been recognized in the tax literature that VAT exemption of financial services has a 
number of undesirable consequences that lead to some important market distortions. One of 
such consequences is tax cascading that occurs as a result of financial institutions and their 
business customers not being able to recover VAT paid on the purchased inputs. Exemption 
implies that financial institutions are not allowed to charge VAT on their services as well as 
they are not allowed to get VAT credits for the purchased inputs, like computers, office 
equipment, etc. That does not mean that the prices that financial institutions charge on their 
services contain no VAT. In fact, they certainly do so. Being unable to recover VAT from 
purchased inputs, financial institutions pass it on through the prices to their clients. The 
problem is that under exemption it is not only financial institutions that are not allowed to get 
VAT credits for purchased inputs, but also those to whom they sell financial services. Hence, 
businesses that use financial services as productive inputs have to pay higher price for such 
services than what they would have paid if financial sector had been subject to VAT. When 
selling their products, businesses charge VAT on their value added, which already contains 
some of the VAT from financial services. In this way, hidden VAT travels through the whole 
production and distribution chain forward to the final consumers, giving them no choice but 
to pay VAT on VAT, thus leading to tax cascading. Figure 1 provides with an illustrative 
example.  
 
         Figure 1. Tax cascading 
 
All this goes in contradiction with main VAT principles, namely neutrality of VAT and its 
proportionality to the prices. In addition, hidden VAT becomes a tax on production, 
Suppliers 
• Producer price 100  
• VAT 25% 
• Selling price 125 
Financial 
institutions 
• Value added 100 
• No VAT charged 
• Selling price 225 
Businesses 
• Value added  100 
• VAT 25% of 325 
• Selling price 406,25  
Final 
consumers 
• Consumer price  
406,25 
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something that is considered more than undesirable by tax policy makers. This last point is 
largely supported in the tax theory by the production efficiency theorem, which prescribes 
that: “the optimal tax structure includes no intermediate good taxes, since these would 
prevent efficiency” (Diamond and Mirrlees, op. cit., p. 24). The intuition behind the 
production efficiency argument could be that in the absence of the right for VAT rebates, 
businesses might have incentives to substitute financial services by other inputs or just reduce 
the use of such services in the production (for example, buy less insurance than what is 
socially desirable). Another possibility is that businesses might choose to self-produce 
financial services, something that could potentially result in efficiency costs for the economy 
as a whole. 
On the other hand, the VAT exemption of financial sector makes its services relatively 
cheaper in comparison to other goods and services. This applies mainly to financial 
institutions’ customers who are also VAT-exempt (for example, households and not VAT-
registered businesses). As a result, such price differences might result in too high demand for 
financial services, something that would make financial sector grow faster, than what is 
socially desirable. 
Another distortion, pointed out by Huizinga (2002), is related to the fact that not all countries 
have VAT on consumption goods (for example, USA). This puts financial institutions in the 
countries with VAT at disadvantage in terms of competition between banks. Such 
competitive disadvantage would be truly reduced if financial institutions in the countries 
with VAT could be able to receive VAT rebates on the purchased inputs, i.e. if the VAT 
exemption was lifted. 
Finally, VAT exemption of the financial sector creates some administrative disadvantages 
for financial institutions. This is because not all financial services are VAT exempt, for 
example investment consulting services or safety box rentals are subject to VAT, implying 
that the VAT on inputs that are used in production of such services is creditable. Hence, 
financial institutions have to bear an extra administrative cost related to determining which 
inputs are actually used in production of exempt services and thus are subject to VAT 
rebates, and which are not.  
The fact that the present-day VAT system causes these types of distortions gives clear signals 
to tax policy makers that something has to be changed. Indeed, we find numerous proposals 
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in the tax literature on how these distortions could be mitigated, if not altogether eliminated. 
Different countries have made attempts to compensate for VAT exemption of the financial 
sector by imposing special taxes on banks and other suppliers of financial services. Box 1 
outlines some of the international practices in taxation of the financial sector.  
Box 1. International practices in taxation of financial services.1 
This box presents a short overview over some of the international practices in the taxation of 
financial services. 
In Denmark the wage costs in the financial sector are subject to compensatory taxes. Such 
taxes are supposed to work as substitutes for the VAT. However, they fail to capture the 
value added created through the profits in the financial sector. Moreover, as Huizinga (op. 
cit.) points out, they contribute to even larger over-taxation of businesses, since the 
additional wage taxes cannot be recovered by financial institutions’ business customers. In 
2013 Denmark also imposed a special taxation of non-life insurance premiums. 
France has also introduced special taxes on wages in the financial sector. 
Non-life insurance premiums in Finland are subject to the tax at the same rate as the VAT 
on other goods and services (with some exceptions). Special taxation is also applied to 
securities’ trading that takes place in unregulated markets. 
In Germany a special bank tax was imposed on banks’ liabilities side. Larger financial 
institutions have to pay this tax at a higher rate.  
In Iceland and Israel both labor inputs and large profits in the financial sector are subject to 
additional compensatory taxation. 
In New Zealand most financial services are VAT-exempt. The exception is fire and general 
insurance, which is subject to New Zealand Goods and Services Tax (GST). In order to 
mitigate some of the distortions related to over-taxation of businesses, New Zealand has 
introduced zero-rating of financial services supplied to GST-registered business customers, 
whose taxable supplies account to 75% of total supplies. Financial services provided to other 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The information presented in Box 1 is collected from various sources, among others, from Schenk (2010), 
Huizinga (2002) and Keen (2011). 
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businesses and final consumers stay VAT-exempt. 
Financial services in Quebec are zero-rated, meaning that financial institutions charge no 
VAT on their services, but still are allowed to recover the VAT on purchased inputs. The 
zero-rating of financial services is combined with additional taxation on wages and capital 
inputs in the financial sector. 
 
Some of the taxation forms mentioned in Box 1, namely taxation of profits and remuneration 
in financial institutions, has been referred to by the IMF as a Financial Activity Tax (FAT) 
(Keen, 2011). The IMF has considered several forms of the FAT, as possible solutions to the 
problems related to the VAT exemption of the financial sector, but recognized that all of 
them suffer from a number of substantial issues. For example, imposing the FAT on financial 
institutions does not eliminate tax cascading, since no mechanism for input VAT credits has 
been developed for the FAT. Other issues are related to international adjustment and 
choosing the proper tax base (see Devereux, 2011). 
Still the obvious solution to the problems related to the exemption would be, of course, to 
introduce VAT on all financial services, and give financial institutions and businesses the 
right to reclaim VAT paid on inputs. Unfortunately, it is not that simple… 
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3 Why is it difficult to apply VAT to 
financial services? 
Value added tax is a general sales tax, which in principle is to be applied to all final 
consumption. What is the value added generated by, say, a firm that produces and sells office 
equipment? Well, it is the total value of its sales minus the total value of the purchased inputs 
that the firm used in its production process. The calculation of these values should not pose 
any problem for such a firm, since it is rather straightforward. Then the value added will be 
reflected in the explicit price that the firm will charge for the produced equipment. Hence, the 
most common approach of levying VAT is via the invoice-credit method, where VAT is 
calculated as a proportion of the price of a good or a service.  
But what about a firm or institution that produces and sells financial services? In principle, if 
provided financial service is charged by a fixed fee or a commission, than the application of 
VAT should not cause any difficulties. The challenge starts when one attempts to apply VAT 
on margin-based financial services, for example intermediation between lenders and 
borrowers. The main problem is that it is rather difficult to attach an explicit price to such 
services, and therefore calculate the value added created by them. There are several reasons 
for that: 
First of all, most financial firms/institutions use largely a different type of inputs than firms 
that produce office equipment, namely capital. Pricing financial capital is not as 
straightforward, since most financial institutions do not “purchase” capital, but rather acquire 
it in the capital markets or by taking in deposits. And what is the price paid for a deposit? 
One could suggest that it should be the deposit rate that the financial institution, say, a bank, 
promises to the depositor. This is not correct, since the deposit interest rate reflects not only 
the direct cost to the bank of taking in a deposit, but also all the services that the bank 
provides to the depositor. The value of these services is reflected in the lower deposit interest 
rate. Pricing a loan creates similar difficulties, since interest rate on loans includes some 
compensation for the risk of default, i.e. a loan-specific risk premium. So while in a perfect 
world the value added created by financial services would be equal to the spread between the 
loan interest rate and the deposit rate, in our not so perfect world it is difficult to verify “what 
part of the variance in lending rates reflects profits (which should be subject to VAT) and 
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what part reflects the risk premium (which should not be subject to VAT since it is part of the 
cost of inputs)” (Huizinga, op. cit., p. 504). 
Even if the issue of dividing the spread into its components could be overcome, there is 
another problem, namely how to allocate the value added between lenders and borrowers. For 
example, if a lender (a depositor) is a private household and the borrower is a VAT registered 
firm, then the latter would have the right to receive a VAT credit on the purchased inputs. 
The question is how much of the value added created by the financial intermediation service 
is actually provided to the borrower and how much is enjoyed by the lender. In principle, one 
could use a reference interest rate to address this issue. Here the reference interest rate (or 
“world” interest rate, or “pure” interest rate) represents the opportunity cost of lenders and 
borrowers, i.e. the interest rate at which the borrower could have borrowed and the lender 
could have lent, if they chose not to use financial institution as an intermediary. For example, 
Poddar and English (1997) suggest that the “pure” interest rate could be the rate of return that 
the government can earn on its cash balances. At the same time, Norwegian Ministry of 
Finance, in their proposition for the National Budget 2014, suggest that the reference rate 
(they call it benchmark interest rate) could be different for each financial institution. In 
particular, they suggest that such institutions should be permitted to calculate their own 
benchmark rates, and be allowed to use them after being approved by the authorities 
(Norwegian Ministry of Finance, op. cit.).  
In order to see how the reference rate helps to allocate the value added between lenders and 
borrowers, consider the following example: 
Assume there is no risk of default, and a bank receives deposits from households and issues 
loans to the VAT registered business customers. For simplicity, we also assume that there are 
no material inputs used by the bank, i.e. the only input factor is labor. Suppose, that the 
deposit rate is 2%, the interest rate on loans is 10% and the reference interest rate is 7%. Then 
the value added generated by the intermediation services of the bank is 10% - 2% =8% of the 
deposits. These 8% should be allocated between the borrowers and the lenders. Especially, 
this allocation will be important to the borrowers, the VAT registered businesses, since they 
have the right to receive VAT credit on purchased inputs (in our case it is capital borrowed 
from the bank). Using the reference interest rate, we see that the value added provided to the 
borrower is 10% - 7% = 3% of the loan, and the valued added provided to the depositor is 7% 
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- 2% = 5%. Thus if the VAT rate is 25% and the amount borrowed from the households and 
lent to the business customers is 10000NOK, then: 
Value added created by the bank 10000 X 0.08 = 800 NOK 
Total VAT 800 x 0.25 = 200 NOK 
Value added provided to the depositor 10000 x 0.05 = 500 NOK 
VAT paid by the depositor 500 x 0.25 = 125 NOK 
Value added provided to the borrower 10000 x 0.03 = 300 NOK 
VAT paid by the borrower (and then recovered) 300 x 0.25 = 75 NOK 
 
Note that the sum of the value added provided to the lender and the borrower equals the total 
value added created by the intermediation services of the bank, and the sum of VAT paid by 
the borrower and the lender equals the total VAT charged by the bank. As noted before, the 
75 NOK that the borrower has to pay in VAT can be recovered, since the borrower is a 
registered business customer. 
The difficulties described above have been presented by many tax economists as the main 
reason for financial services to be and stay exempt from VAT. The question, though, 
remains: Can these technical difficulties be overcome, conceptually and practically? 
Conceptually the problems associated with applying VAT to financial services might be 
solved using Cash-flow method (Poddar and English (op. cit.), Huizinga (op. cit.), Zee 
(2005)). Whether this solution is practical depends on when the question is asked. The 
answer to it in 1998 would probably be: “Not likely”. However the advances of the modern 
IT systems and developments in information technology during last decades truly make the 
cash-flow approach implementable not only conceptually, but also practically.  
The main principles of the cash-flow taxation are introduced in the next section. More 
detailed description of the method can be found in “Taxation of Financial Services Under a 
Value-Added Tax: Applying the Cash-Flow Approach” by Poddar and English (op. cit.). 
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4 Cash flow method 
Perhaps the most developed version of the cash-flow method for taxation of margin-based 
financial services belongs to Satya Poddar and Morley English. The method suggests that all 
inflows to financial institutions should be treated as taxable sales, while all outflows should 
be treated as purchases of taxable inputs. The authors show that such method of taxation is 
fully compatible with the standard credit-invoice form of VAT, which is applied to non-
financial goods and services (Poddar and English, op. cit.). In addition, the method exhibits 
some other desirable features. For instance, applying the cash flow taxation resolves the so-
called “dividing-the-margin” issue, i.e. there is no need to disaggregate the margin to its 
components in order to identify the value-added. Moreover, the cash-flow method fully 
eliminates tax cascading on financial services supplied to businesses.  
In order to better understand how the cash-flow taxation would work in the financial sector, 
we can look at an example of applying the method on the financial intermediation services 
between lenders and borrowers. 
Cash flow method – example 
Suppose there is a bank that provides intermediation services between borrowers and lenders. 
Borrowers and lenders are either private households (i.e. not VAT registered consumers of 
financial services), or businesses (VAT registered customers). The interest rates offered by 
the bank, as well as the reference rate and the VAT rate in the example are as follows: 
Interest rate on deposits 2% 
Interest rate on loans 4% 
Reference interest rate  3% 
VAT rate 25% 
 
There are two periods in the example. In the beginning of the first period both households 
and businesses place their deposits in the bank and take loans from the bank. In the second 
period the loans are repaid and the deposits are withdrawn. In addition, it is assumed that the 
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bank has the opportunity to use other sources of capital (for example, interbank market, 
government bonds, etc.) All the cash inflows and cash outflows, as well as VAT to be paid or 
received, in the first period are collected in Table 1:  
 Bank inflows Bank outflows VAT 
Period 1    
Deposits from households 
Deposits from businesses 
Lending to households 
Lending to businesses 
Other sources of capital 
1000 
1000 
 
 
2000 
 
 
(2000) 
(2000) 
250 
250 
(500) 
(500) 
500 
Subtotal 4000 (4000) 0 
    Table 1. Banks’s cash flows and VAT credits/liabilities in the first period 
 
Note that brackets around a number mean that this number is negative. 
In the first period 2000 in total deposits (from households and businesses), as well as 2000 
from other sources of finance, are registered as bank’s cash inflows and are thus subject to 
25% VAT, i.e. the bank is subject to incoming VAT equal to 1000. At the same time, the 
loans that the bank provides to households and businesses (total amount of 4000) are bank’s 
cash outflows. The VAT on the loans is thus registered as outgoing VAT, allowing the bank 
to receive input tax credit in amount of 1000. In the first period VAT on inflows and outflows 
cancel out, so that the net VAT liability is zero. 
Bank’s cash flows and tax liabilities in the second period are presented in Table 2: 
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 Bank inflows Bank outflows VAT 
Period 2    
Loan repayment from households 
Loan interest 
Loan repayment from businesses 
Loan interest 
Deposit withdrawal by households 
Deposit interest 
Deposit withdrawal by businesses 
Deposit interest 
Repaying to other sources 
Interest on other sources 
2000 
80 
2000 
80 
 
 
 
 
(1000) 
(20) 
(1000) 
(20) 
(2000) 
(60) 
500 
20 
500 
20 
(250) 
(5) 
(250) 
(5) 
(500) 
(15) 
Total 4160 (4100) 15 
    
Total value of services = 60   
VAT = 15   
    Table 2. Bank’s cash flows and VAT credits/ liabilities in the second period 
 
In the second period bank’s inflows consist of loan repayments (principal plus the interest) in 
total amount of 4160. This amount is treated as revenues from sale. The bank is then subject 
to incoming VAT in amount of 1040. Deposit withdrawals, as well as interest payments and 
repayment to other sources of finance, are bank’s outflows treated as purchase. The VAT on 
these outflows (4100*0.25=1025) can be recovered by the bank. However, since the VAT on 
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the cash inflow associated with paid interest on loans is larger than the outgoing VAT on 
deposit interest (1040-1025=15), the bank faces a tax liability in amount of 15, which is 25% 
of the total value of the intermediation service supplied by the bank.  
The VAT system allows businesses to rebate the VAT paid on inputs used in production of 
final goods. In order to recover the VAT paid on financial services from the bank, business 
customers would have to use an accounting system that is similar to the one that is used by 
the bank, and thus calculate the recoverable VAT based on the cash inflows and outflows. 
Table 3 shows how this calculation would be carried out. 
 Businesses inflows Businesses outflows VAT 
Period 1    
Loan 
Deposit 
2000  
(1000) 
500 
(250) 
Subtotal 2000 (1000) 250 
    
Period 2    
Loan repayment 
Loan interest 
Deposit withdrawal 
Deposit interest 
 
 
1000 
20 
(2000) 
(80) 
(500) 
(20) 
250 
5 
Subtotal 1020 (2080) (265) 
Total 3020 (3080) (15) 
    Table 3. Business customer’s cash flows and VAT credits/liabilities 
 
In the first period the business customer is subject to net VAT liability of 250, which is 25% 
of the difference between business customer’s cash inflow associated with the loan from the 
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bank, and cash outflow associated with the deposit placed in the bank. In the second period 
the customer is entitled to VAT credit of 520-255=265. This means that in total he receives 
VAT credit of 15, which is exactly 25% of the value added provided to the business customer 
by he bank (0.25*(3080-3020) =15).  
The government revenues from the VAT would be then: 
Government revenues  
Period 1 Tax 
Interest earned at 3% 
Period 2 Tax (15 - 265) 
Total 
250 
7.5 
(250)  
7.5 
    Table 4. Government revenues 
 
Government revenues in amount of 7.5 are exactly equal to 25% of the value of the banking 
services to household depositors: (1000*1.03-2000*1.03+2080-1020)*0.25=7.5. 
So, why are we still not enjoying all the merits of the cash flow taxation of the financial 
services? Indeed, the cash flow method has received a large portion of critique for a number 
of substantial drawbacks associated with it. The most serious of these is the presence of large 
administrative and compliance costs, which businesses would have to bear in order to 
calculate their deductible tax on inputs purchased from the financial institutions. (VAT-
registered firms would have to perform all the accounting operations and calculations by their 
own means, thus significantly reducing the benefits from input VAT credits). Hence, such 
costs would be especially burdensome for small and medium-sized enterprises. In addition, 
cash flow tax would impose some extra borrowing requirements on businesses. That is 
because the tax would have to be paid on every cash inflow (for example, a loan from a 
bank), thus increasing the amount needed for financing this tax. Finally, the cash-flow 
method fails to take into account tax rate changes, which would be especially significant in 
the period of introducing the tax.  
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As the solution to these issues, Poddar and English (op. cit.) developed another version of the 
cash flow method, which they called ”Truncated Cash-Flow Method with Tax Calculated 
Account”. The method implies that all the cash-flow computations would be carried out by 
financial institutions, thus relieving businesses from the large compliance costs. Financial 
institutions would also issue a periodic tax invoice which they would send to their business 
customers, thus allowing them to claim tax credit on the purchased inputs. At the same time, 
the use of tax calculated accounts (TCA) would allow businesses and financial institutions to 
defer the tax payments on capital inflows by debiting them to the TCA. The same would also 
apply to the tax credits on capital outflows. At the end of the reporting period the balance on 
the TCA would be adjusted for interest rate changes, and the amounts to be paid/recieved 
would be calculated.  
The truncated cash-flow method with TCA was piloted in a number of finacial companies in 
Europe during 1996-1998. “The results of the study indicated that the TCA method was 
technically feasible, but concerns were raised regarding disclosure of proprietary 
information, application to complex financial instruments, and cost of implementation” 
(Merrill, 2011, p. 175).   
As a possible solution to some of the issues mentioned above, Huizinga (op. cit.) came up 
with a proposal of a simplified TCA method, suggesting that all financial services to business 
customers should be zero-rated. This would imply no tax charged for the services supplied to 
businesses by financial institutions, and hence, no tax credit claimed by businesses for the 
purchased services. Applying TCA method with zero-rating would solve the issue of 
disclosure of proprietary information, since no invoices would be sent to business customers, 
and thus no information about implicit pricing (which is considered proprietary by some 
financial institutions) would have to be shared. Moreover, the introduction of this method 
would truly decrease the compliance costs associated with TCA system, since the accounts 
related to business customers would be excluded from the system. 
In spite of the technical feasibility of the cash-flow taxation of the financial services, no 
country has adopted any of the versions of this method. Considerable compliance costs are 
claimed to be the main reason for that, as noted by IMF (see IMF, 2010). Unfortunately, there 
is not much discussion in the tax literature about whether concerns for too high compliance 
costs can justify the consequences of the distortions that the exempt treatment of the financial 
services causes for the economy as a whole. As Arthur Kerrigan at the European Commission 
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stated: “As is sometimes the case, issues that are perceived as either technically complex or 
politically sensitive stall on the question of whether there is a really pressing problem to be 
addressed” (Kerrigan 2010, p. 10). 
As mentioned above, high compliance costs remain the main stumbling point for applying the 
cash flow method of taxation on financial services. So how could a specific country deal with 
the presence of those? The problem is that whereas for some financial institutions such costs 
would not necessarily represent a large burden, other financial institutions might find them 
hard to bear. Unfortunately, there is not much empirical evidence on the matter. That is why 
we could only assume that the ones that could potentially cope with administrative and 
compliance costs when following the cash-flow approach of taxation, are large financial 
institutions, which are believed to be dependent on purchase of large amounts of taxable 
inputs (computers, office equipment, renting office space, etc.). For such institutions the net 
benefit from VAT credits on purchased inputs (VAT credits minus the compliance costs) 
might be positive. Hence, they might prefer to be allowed to charge VAT on their services. 
One of the proposals from the European Commission that takes into account this possibility, 
namely “option to tax” proposal, is the subject of the next section. 
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5 Option to tax (O2T) 
The VAT exemption systems in Norway and in Europe are much alike, also with respect to 
financial services.  The consequences of VAT exemption of financial services in the 
European Union, as well as feasible alternatives to exemption, have been one of the topical 
subjects for debate in the tax literature, especially during the last decade. In the 1990s the 
European Commission started working on developing the methods of including financial 
services into the VAT system. This was the EC’s attempt to address the problem of “hidden 
VAT” that leads to tax cascading and thus creates a number of economic distortions. Among 
the proposed methods was, for example, full taxation of financial services by using the cash-
flow approach. As mentioned above, this method was pilot tested in the late 1990s, but never 
adopted due to its complexity and considerable compliance costs. As a result, the European 
Commission developed a new proposal that would allow financial institutions to opt into 
taxation of the most of the exempt services (except for insurance) (see European 
Commission, 2006). The motivation behind this proposal was the EC’s recognition that: 
”Rather than imposing mandatory taxation of financial services, granting O2T to financial 
institutions would allow them the flexibility to develop the procedures and systems for 
taxation of their services on an elective basis” (European Banking Federation, 2009, p. 54).  
So, how does it work? The Member States are allowed to introduce the O2T on all or part of 
the financial services. Then financial institutions that are situated in the countries with O2T 
may choose whether to exercise the option or not. Those institutions that choose to exercise 
the option are then allowed to claim VAT credits on purchased inputs used in production of 
their services. At the same time, the tax charged on the services purchased by businesses, 
may also be recovered if such services are used as inputs in production. The O2T is either 
irrecoverable, or binding for a certain period of time. 
The option to tax does not seem to have evoked much interest by the member states, as only 
few countries have introduced it, to some limited extent. For example, in Belgium the O2T is 
only applied to payment and receipt transactions, while in France financial institutions have a 
right to charge VAT on almost all financial services (except for such services as granting 
loans, some services related to operating with securities and foreign currency, etc.). In 
Germany financial institutions may opt for taxation of all exempt services, but only when 
they are provided to business customers.  
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The main reasons for so little interest in introducing O2T are believed to be lack of clarity 
and guidance on how to implement the option, as well as uncertainty about the effects of the 
O2T on the input tax deductions (Feria and Lockwood, 2009). For instance, among the 
aspects of O2T that are perceived to stay unclear are: whether O2T is to be exercised on a 
transaction-by-transaction basis or be applied to transactions of a given category or all 
categories; whether O2T should apply to financial services supplied only to business 
customers or to both businesses and households; and finally, how the tax base is to be 
determined (European Banking Federation, op. cit.). 
All in all, the O2T is a relatively new proposal that has not gone through much empirical 
testing. The lack of clarity in its design, as well as differences in its interpretation, are quite 
understandable, since the system is meant to be as uniform as possible within the European 
Union, but still be operational in several different countries that might not necessarily have 
the same interests regarding their financial sectors. In their final report to European Banking 
Federation Ernst and Young state that: ”The Commission appears for the moment to have 
deliberately chosen to leave the door open for all variants of the O2T, other than the 
requirement that it should be available in all Member States and that there should be greater 
uniformity or consistency in its application” (European Banking Federation, op. cit., p. 57). 
The VAT regulations in Norway do not allow financial institutions to opt into taxation of any 
of their services. Nevertheless, option to tax is not a completely unknown phenomenon in 
Norway. For example, farming and agricultural holdings, as well as non-businesses that 
develop water supply and sewage, may choose to opt into taxation of their goods and 
services. The same applies to lessors of buildings or plants used by VAT registered 
businesses (KPMG, 2013).  
In the model presented in this thesis I assume that the O2T is also offered to financial 
institutions. This assumption is quite theoretical/hypothetical, and is not supported by any 
empirical evidence or testing results from Norway. In other words, we do not know with 
certainty whether O2T would work for the financial sector in Norway or not. Neither do we 
know whether O2T would have desirable effects on the Norwegian economy, i.e. whether 
introducing the option would result in increased tax revenues and mitigated distortions 
caused by the exemption. However that may be, O2T might be a decent candidate for 
addressing the issue of high compliance costs associated with the introduction of the cash-
flow taxation to the financial sector, and hence, is worth considering.  
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Before introducing the model, there is one more issue that needs to be addressed, namely the 
theoretical perspective on the VAT exemption of financial services. Beside large compliance 
costs associated with imposing of VAT on margin-based financial services, there might be, in 
fact, another reason for financial services to stay VAT exempt. This reason finds its roots in 
theory of optimal taxation. As mentioned in the introduction, there is a number of theoretical 
arguments in favor of VAT exemption of margin-based financial services. Some of these 
arguments are introduced in the next section. 
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6 Why should financial services not be 
taxed? 
Beside the technical reasons for VAT exemption of financial services there is a number of 
theoretical arguments suggesting that financial sector should continue to be exempt from 
VAT. For example, Grubert and Mackie (op. cit.) argue that since financial services do not 
provide any direct utility to their consumers, but merely are an intermediate good, then 
following the production efficiency theorem of Diamond and Mirrlees, they should not be 
taxed. This argument, however, has received a portion of critique and was labeled as 
“unqualified” (Boadway and Keen, op. cit.). In particular, if one were to follow Grubert and 
Mackie’s logics, then such goods as bus tickets, cutlery or tooth brushes should not be taxed 
as well, since they do not yield direct utility to consumers, but rather perform a function of 
intermediary goods: for instance, a tooth brush serves as an instrument to keep one’s teeth 
healthy, but does not provide any utility by just having it.   
Another theoretical argument supporting VAT exemption of financial services states that 
taxing margin-based financial services would increase the relative prices of such services, 
thus creating an additional distortion (Jack, op. cit., Chia and Whalley, op. cit.). The 
supporters of this argument claim that a consumption tax on all other goods will 
automatically increase the cost of financial services. And if the size of the interest rate spread 
that financial institutions use to finance their services is fixed, then the price for these 
services will increase as well. Thus in order to maintain the choice between current and 
future consumption undistorted, one should not apply VAT on interest margins, but only on 
financial services charged for by fixed fees and commissions.   
Similar conclusions can be found in the papers by Auerbach and Gordon (op. cit.) and 
Boadway and Keen (op. cit.), where the authors use a two-period consumption-investment 
model to show that intermediation margins should not be taxed, while fixed payment services 
(for example use of a credit card) should be subject to a uniform consumption tax. Lockwood 
(2010) uses a dynamic general equilibrium model to solve a tax design problem and comes to 
a similar conclusion for one commodity case (in the case with many commodities he finds 
that the payment services do not necessarily need to be taxed at the same uniform rate as 
other commodities). 
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All these authors build their conclusions on the assumption that the interest rate spread is a 
fixed value. In the model presented in this thesis I relax this assumption, letting the spread to 
vary with the level of savings. In particular, I choose a somewhat different approach to 
addressing the issue of taxation of the margin-based financial services, namely by showing 
that imposing a consumption tax on financial services does not necessarily result in the 
socially optimal allocation of resources, but brings the market allocation closer to the one that 
is socially optimal. 
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7 The model 
We are looking at a two-period consumption-investment model with three types of agents: 
households, firms and a monopolistic (and monopsonistic) bank. In the first period 
households allocate their disposable income between consumption and saving, and firms 
produce consumption goods by using labor from households and some given amount of 
capital as inputs. Households’ savings are deposited in the bank. In the second period the 
initial capital is run out, and firms have to borrow capital from the bank. Households’ labor 
and borrowed capital are then used in the production of the consumption good. At the end of 
the second period firms pay back the loans (principal plus the interest) to the bank, and the 
bank pays back deposits (principal plus the interest) to households. It is assumed that 
households own both the firms and the bank, so that all the profits from firms’ and bank’s 
activities are transferred to households at the end of each period. There is no uncertainty or 
risk in the model, so that all actions and outcomes are perfectly predictable at any point of 
time, and all the agents are able to commit to their optimal behavior at the beginning of the 
first period. 
 
7.1 The benchmark 
As a benchmark I look first at the situation when there are no taxes in the economy.  
I assume that in each period there is a fixed amount of time (equal to 1), which is to be 
divided between leisure, work and, in the second period, time/labor appropriated by the bank. 
Hence, we have: 
 1= L1 + l1 = L2 + l2 +B ,   
where L1and L2  are labor inputs in the production of the consumption good in the 
corresponding periods, l1  and l2  denote the amount of leisure in the corresponding period, 
and B  is labor used in banking.  
In the model it is assumed that the banking sector is labor intensive (labor is the only input 
used in the production of financial services). The labor is used for administering deposits and 
loans, as well as looking for the projects to finance and ensuring that every loan is repaid. 
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Since the amount of loans will also depend on the size of deposits, we can assume (for 
simplicity), that the size of B  is proportional only to the amount of loans, K . Hence, we 
have:  
 B =αK , with α > 0 . (1) 
 
7.1.1 Households 
In each period households supply labor and receive real wage w . Households are assumed to 
be identical, with preferences represented by the intertemporal utility function:  
 U = u(C1, l1)+βu(C2, l2 ) ,   
where C1  and C2  stand for consumption of the good in the first and the second periods, and 
β  is the discount factor. The utilities are assumed to be strictly increasing and strictly 
quasiconcave in their arguments.  
At the end of the first period, households have to allocate their disposable income between 
consumption and savings. By savings it is meant that households open deposit accounts in the 
bank. Deposits are assumed to earn the interest rate, rd , per unit of deposits, and are to be 
withdrawn at the end of the second period.  
In each period households supply labor and receive labor income 
€ 
Y , such that:  
 
€ 
Y1 = w1L1 = w1(1− l1)   
 Y2 = w2 (L2 +B) = w2 (1− l2 )   
Households’ disposable income thus comes from labor income and firms’ maximized profits.  
In the first period households decide how much of the disposable income will be consumed 
and how much will be deposited in the bank. Hence, the first-period budget constraint is:  
 C1 + S = w1L1 +π1 = w1(1− l1)+π1⇔C1 = w1(1− l1)+π1 − S ,  
where S  is households’ savings deposited in the bank, and π1  is firms’ profit in the first 
period. 
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In the second period households consume the returns from savings, labor income from 
working, as well as firms’ and bank’s profits, so that the second period budget constraint is:  
 C2 = w2 L2 +B( )+ (1+ rd )S +π 2 +Π = w2 (1− l2 )+ (1+ rd )S +π 2 +Π ,  
where rd  is the interest rate on deposits, and Π  is the profit of the bank.  
It is assumed that the consumption good produced in the second period is consumed in the 
same period. The price for the good is equal to 1 in both periods. Moreover, all the capital 
used in the production of the consumption good is assumed to depreciate at the end of the 
second period. Since there is no uncertainty in the model, households are able to plan and 
commit to their optimal consumption and leisure paths, as well as the optimal saving, at the 
beginning of the first period.  
Households’ decision problem is then to maximize the utility subject to their budget 
constraints, i.e.: 
 
Max
C1,C2 ,l1,l2
U = u(C1, l1)+βu(C2, l2 )  
subject to 
C1 = w1(1− l1)+π1 − S
C2 = w2 (1− l2 )+ (1+ rd )S +π 2 +Π
#
$
%
  
 
Inserting for C1  and C2  into the utility function gives the following maximization problem: 
Max
S,l1,l2
V (S, l1, l2 ) := u(w1(1− l1)+π1 − S, l1)+βu(w2 (1− l2 )+ (1+ rd )S +π 2 +Π, l2 )  
The first order conditions of this problem are:  
 
∂V (S, l1, l2 )
∂l1
=
∂u
∂C1
−w1( )+
∂u
∂l1
= 0  (2) 
 
∂V (S, l1, l2 )
∂l2
= β
∂u
∂C2
−w2( )+β
∂u
∂l2
= 0  (3) 
 
∂V (S, l1, l2 )
∂S = −
∂u
∂C1
+β
∂u
∂C2
1+ rd( ) = 0  (4) 
Rearranging (2) and (3) we get: 
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∂u
∂l1
∂u
∂C1
= w1
       
and
        
€ 
∂u
∂l2
∂u
∂C2
= w2   
These are intratemporal optimality conditions which show that at the optimum the marginal 
rate of substitution between consumption and leisure in each period must be equal to the 
relative price for labor in the same period, i.e. that the required amount of consumption goods 
for working one extra hour must be equal to the real wage.  
Rearranging the terms in (4) gives: 
 
€ 
∂u
∂C1
β
∂u
∂C2
−1 = rd  (5) 
This is the intertemporal optimality condition. The LHS is the required rate of return from 
savings, which is the number of next period consumption units one must receive in 
compensation for one unit reduced consumption in the first period2; whereas the RHS is the 
realized rate of return from savings which is equal to the deposit interest rate.  	  	  
7.1.2 Firms 
There is a representative firm, which produces a consumption good, X , in both periods by 
the use of labor and capital. The production technology is F(K,L) . The firm faces decreasing 
returns to scale and operates in a competitive market. In the first period the firm is endowed 
with some amount of capital that is used as an input (together with labor) in production of the 
consumer good in the first period.  
The profit in the first period can be then written as:  
 π1 = F(K0,L1)−w1L1 ,  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Minus one so as to get at relative rate or percentage. 
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where K0  is the initial capital endowment of the firm, exogenously given. For simplicity it is 
assumed that this initial capital stock has no value outside the firm. 
The firm thus chooses the amount of labor in order to maximize the profit. The optimum will 
be characterized by the following condition: 
 
∂F(K0,L1)
∂L1
= w1  (6) 
The condition tells us that at the optimum the marginal product of labor is equal to the real 
wage.  
It is assumed that the capital used in the production in the first period depreciates totally. 
Thus at the end of the first period the firm borrows new capital from the bank in order to use 
it as input in the production of the consumption good in the second period. At the end of the 
second period the firm has to pay back (1+ rl )  per unit of capital to the bank, where rl  is the 
interest rate on loans. So the firm’s profit in the second period is:  
 π 2 = F(K,L2 )−w2L2 − (1+ rl )K ,  
where K  is the amount of capital borrowed from the bank. 
The firm maximizes the profit with respect to labor and capital, so that in the optimum we 
get: 
 
€ 
∂F(K,L2)
∂L2
= w2 (7) 
 
€ 
∂F(K,L2)
∂K =1+ r
l , (8) 
where, as before, the conditions ensure that the marginal products of the inputs are equal to 
their corresponding prices. 
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7.1.3 Monopolistic bank 
The monopolistic/monopsonistic bank is assumed to demand labor in the second period. The 
amount of labor used by the bank is proportional to the amount of loans, i.e. B =αK , where 
α > 0 . The bank is assumed to have zero equity and face a downward sloping demand 
function for loans and an upward sloping deposit function.  This implies that the amount of 
savings that households deposit in the bank, is a function of the deposit rate, so that:  
 S = S(rd ) , with !S (rd ) ≥ 0 ,  
while the amount of loans issued by the bank is a function of the interest rate on loans, so 
that:  
 K = K(rl ) , with !K (rl )< 0 .  
It is assumed that the bank has no other funding sources than the deposits from households. 
Hence, the bank chooses amount of loans and deposits K,S( )  to maximize its profit subject 
to the feasibility constraint3:  
 MaxK ,S Π(K,S) = r
l (K )K − rd (S)S −αw2K  subject to K ≤ S   
The Lagrangian function for this problem is:  
 L(K,S) = rl (K )K − rd (S)S −αw2K −λ K − S( ),   
where λ  is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the feasibility constraint. 
The solution to the problem is characterized by the following first order conditions:  
 
∂L(K,S)
∂K =
drl
dK K + r
l (K )−αw2 −λ = 0   
 ∂L(K,S)
∂S = −
drd
dS S − r
d (S)+λ = 0 ,  
as well as the complementary slackness conditions:  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 The bank’s feasibility constraint, K ≤ S , implies that the bank has no other sources of finance than deposits 
from households. 
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 λ > 0,  ( λ = 0,  if K < S )  
 K ≤ S   
If K < S , then λ = 0 , which implies that:  
 −
drd
dS S − r
d (S) = 0⇒ rd (S) = − dr
d
dS S = −
S
#S (rd ) < 0 ,  
which is impossible, since deposit interest rate is assumed to be strictly positive and 
!S (rd ) ≥ 0 .  
Hence, we must have that:  
 K = S  (9) 
This means that if the bank chooses K < S , than it will always be better off increasing 
amount of loans, as long as rl > rd . The bank cannot lend larger amount than what it has in 
deposits. Hence, condition (9) must hold in equilibrium.  
Rearranging the first order condition gives: 
 
1
!K (rl )K(r
l )+ rl −αw2 = λ
1
!S (rd ) S(r
d )+ rd = λ
#
$
%%
&
%
%
⇒ rl − rd =αw2 +
rd
εS
+
rl
εK
> 0 , (10) 
where εS  is the price elasticity of deposits, and εK  is the price elasticity of loans, defined as: 
 
εS := Elrd (S(rd )) =
rd
S(rd ) !S (r
d )> 0
εK := −Elrl (K(rl )) = −
rl
K(rl ) !K (r
l )#
$
%
&
'
(> 0
  
It is assumed that the price elasticities are constant. In particular, I assume that the price 
elasticity of deposits is positive, but smaller than one (inelastic supply of deposits from 
households). The last assumption seems to be generally supported in the literature. For 
example, Beznoska and Ochmann (2011) perform an empirical study based on data from 
Germany, where they investigate the effects of changes in interest rates on household savings 
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and estimate the price elasticity of savings at around zero. Elmendorf (1996) in his survey 
uses an indirect approach in estimating the interest elasticity of savings. He uses, among 
others, a basic life-cycle model, which generates interest elasticity around 0.5.4 
Condition (10) shows that the monopolistic bank will set the volume of loans and deposits in 
such a way that the intermediation margin (the difference between loan and deposit rates) 
does not only reflect the marginal cost associated with labor input, but also the inverse 
elasticities of demand for loans and deposits. The margin will be higher the smaller the 
elasticities are, which in turn will depend on the degree of bank’s market power. If the bank 
has control over the whole market, then the demand elasticities are expected to be very low, 
thus giving the bank high economic profits reflected in large spreads.  
 
7.1.4 Market equilibrium 
Given households’ optimal labor supply and savings decision, the set of equilibrium prices 
rd, rl,w1,w2{ }  will be determined by the following market clearing conditions:  
 
€ 
X1 = F(K0,L1) = S +C1 (11) 
 
€ 
X2 = F(K,L2) = C2 (12) 
 
€ 
1 = L1 + l1 (13) 
 
€ 
1 = L2 + l2 + B, (14) 
where (11) and (12) are clearing conditions for the consumption goods markets in the first 
and the second periods; and (13) and (14) are labor market clearing conditions in the first and 
the second periods.  
Inserting (1) and (9) into the market clearing conditions and rearranging the terms, we get: 
 
€ 
C1 = F(K0,L1) −
B
α
 (15) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 The goal of the survey by Elmendorf (1996) is not to show that interest elasticity of savings is less than one. In 
particular, the author’s main point is that such elasticity cannot be estimated with certainty, but nevertheless, is 
more likely to be positive. 
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€ 
C2 = F
B
α
,L2
# 
$ 
% 
& 
' 
( (16) 
 
€ 
l1 =1− L1 (17) 
 
€ 
l2 =1− L2 − B  (18) 
In the next subsection the social planner will determine the optimal allocation of resources in 
the economy by maximizing households’ utility subject to the conditions (15)-(18).  
 
7.1.5 Social optimum 
To see how the market allocation differs from the socially optimal allocation I next turn to 
the optimization problem of the social planner, whose decision problem is to maximize 
households’ utility subject to (15)-(18). Hence, the social planner solves: 
 Max
B,L1,L2
v(B,L1,L2 ) := u F(K0,L1)−
B
α
,1− L1
"
#
$
%
&
'+βu F B
α
,L2
"
#
$
%
&
',1− L2 −B
"
#
$
%
&
'   
First order conditions of the problem are:  
 
∂v(B,L1,L2 )
∂L1
=
∂u
∂C1
∂F(K0,L1)
∂L1
−
∂u
∂l1
= 0  (19) 
 ∂v(B,L1,L2 )
∂L2
= β
∂u
∂C2
∂F(K,L2 )
∂L2
−
∂u
∂l2
#
$
%
&
'
(= 0  (20) 
 ∂v(B,L1,L2 )
∂B = −
∂u
∂C1
1
α
+β
∂u
∂C2
∂F(K,L2 )
∂K
1
α
−
∂u
∂l2
#
$
%
&
'
(= 0  (21) 
Rearranging (19) and (20) we get:
 
 
€ 
∂u
∂l1
∂u
∂C1
=
∂F(K0,L1)
∂L1
 (22) 
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 ∂u
∂l2
∂u
∂C2
=
∂F(K,L2 )
∂L2
 (23) 
These conditions tell us that at the optimum the marginal rate of substitution between 
consumption and leisure in each period must be equal to the marginal product of labor in the 
same period. 
 
Rearranging the terms in (21) and inserting for ∂u
∂l2
 from (23) we get:
 
€ 
∂u
∂C1
1
α
= β
∂u
∂C2
∂F(K,L2)
∂K
1
α
− β
∂u
∂C2
∂F(K,L2)
∂L2
⇒
∂u
∂C1
= β
∂u
∂C2
∂F(K,L2 )
∂K −α
∂F(K,L2 )
∂L2
"
#
$
%
&
'  
The last condition can be written as: 
 
€ 
∂u
∂C1
β
∂u
∂C2
=
∂F(K,L2)
∂K −α
∂F(K,L2)
∂L2
 (24) 
Condition (24) shows that at the social optimum the marginal rate of substitution between 
consumption in the first and the second period must equal to the difference between the 
marginal product of capital and the marginal product of labor used in the banking sector. 
Inserting (7)-(8) and (10) into (24) gives: 
 
€ 
∂u
∂C1
β
∂u
∂C2
−1 = ∂F(K,L2)
∂K −α
∂F(K,L2)
∂L2
−1 = rl −αw2 = rd +
rd
ε S
+
rl
εK
 (25) 
Recall that the market’s allocation is characterized by (5) 
€ 
∂u
∂C1
β
∂u
∂C2
−1 = rd . Hence, comparing 
(5) and (25) gives us the difference between the socially optimal allocation and the market 
allocation in the no-tax case, i.e.:  
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 ΔnoVAT = rd +
rd
εS
+
rl
εK
"
#
$
%
&
'− rd = r
d
εS
+
rl
εK
"
#
$
%
&
'> 0,   
where 
€ 
Δ noVAT  shows by how much the market allocation deviates from the social optimum.  
This deviation is positive due to the distortions caused by the presence of the market power in 
the economy, and can be perceived as the marginal welfare loss that occurs due to the 
difference between the price and the marginal cost. Indeed, if there was a competitive 
banking sector in this economy, then the spread between deposit interest rate and the interest 
rate on loans would be just equal to the marginal cost associated with the use of labor input in 
the production of financial services, i.e. rl − rd =αw2 . In that case, the difference between the 
socially optimal allocation and the market allocation would be zero. The problem is that the 
bank, being entitled with some market power, is only concerned about its own profits. Hence, 
we can expect that it will set such prices (or such quantities) that maximize these profits. The 
social planner, on the other hand, is concerned about the total welfare surplus, and thus 
chooses the allocation of resources so that this surplus is maximized. This conflict of the 
objectives of the bank and the social planner results in the marginal welfare loss for the 
economy, which in the model is measured by 
€ 
Δ noVAT . 
 
7.2 Introducing VAT 
In this section I introduce VAT on the financial intermediation services with the opportunity 
for financial institutions to opt into taxation. Since there is only one bank in this model, then 
the fraction of financial institutions that will opt into taxation is interpreted here as the 
probability that a bank will choose to be taxed.  
In imposing VAT on financial services in the model I use the cash-flow approach. The 
decision on incorporating the O2T into this model is justified by the presence of large 
compliance costs associated with introduction of cash-flow VAT on financial services. As 
was discussed earlier, while such costs would be a heavy burden for some financial 
institutions, others would find benefits from tax rebates higher than administrative and 
compliance costs caused by introduction and maintenance of new accounting systems. 
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For now, I leave the claim that there will be banks with incentives to opt into taxation, as a 
wild guess. In section 8 I will return to this issue. 
  
7.2.1 Monopolistic bank 
Assume that with probability θ  the bank will choose to charge VAT on its services and get 
VAT credit for the purchased inputs; and with probability (1−θ )  the bank will choose to 
continue being exempt from VAT. 
If the bank chooses to opt in, it has to bear a compliance cost C(K ) , measured in units of 
labor, where C(K )  is assumed to be strictly increasing and strictly concave. 
Imposing the VAT on financial services will normally change the prices for such services. 
Let r l  denote the new interest rate on loans, and r d  denote the new deposit rate. These are 
the prices that firms and households meet whenever they purchase financial services from a 
bank that has opted into taxation. 
Let τ  be the VAT rate, then bank’s expected net cash flow can be written as: 
Z(K,S) =θ(1−τ ) r l (K )K − r d (S)S −αw2K −w2C(K )( )+  
+(1−θ ) rl (K )K − rd (S)S −αw2K( ) =  
=θ(1−τ ) r l (K )K − r d (S)S( )+ (1−θ ) rl (K )K − rd (S)S( )−θ(1−τ )w2C(K )− (1−θτ )αw2K  
The bank maximizes the expected net cash flow subject to the feasibility constraint: K ≤ S , 
which will be binding at the optimum. 
The Lagrangian function of this optimization problem is: 
L(K,S) =θ(1−τ ) r l (K )K − r d (S)S( )+ (1−θ ) rl (K )K − rd (S)S( )−θ(1−τ )w2C(K )−
−(1−θτ )αw2K −λ K − S( )
 
The solution to this problem is characterized by the following first order conditions:  
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∂L(K,S)
∂K =θ(1−τ )
dr l
dK K + r
l#
$
%
&
'
(+ (1−θ ) dr
l
dK K + r
l#
$
%
&
'
(−θ(1−τ )w2 )C (K )− (1−θτ )αw2 −λ = 0  
∂L(K,S)
∂S =θ(1−τ ) −
dr d
dS S − r
d#
$
%
&
'
(+ (1−θ ) − dr
d
dS S − r
d#
$
%
&
'
(+λ = 0,  
The first condition can be written as: 
θ(1−τ ) 1
"K (r l )K(r
l )+θ(1−τ )r l + (1−θ ) 1
"K (rl )K(r
l )+ (1−θ )rl −
−θ(1−τ )w2 "C (K )− (1−θτ )αw2 = λ⇒  
⇒θ(1−τ ) r
l
−εK
+θ(1−τ )r l + (1−θ ) r
l
−εK
+ (1−θ )rl −θ(1−τ )w2 #C (K )− (1−θτ )αw2 = λ  (26) 
Rearranging the terms in the second condition gives: 
θ(1−τ ) 1
"S (r d ) S(r
d )+θ(1−τ )r d + (1−θ ) 1
"S (rd ) S(r
d )+ (1−θ )rd = λ  
⇒θ(1−τ ) r
d
εS
+θ(1−τ )r d + (1−θ ) r
d
εS
+ (1−θ )rd = λ
 
(27) 
Combining (26) and (27) we get: 
θ(1−τ ) r
l
−εK
+θ(1−τ )r l + (1−θ ) r
l
−εK
+ (1−θ )rl −θ(1−τ )w2 "C (K )− (1−θτ )αw2 =
=θ(1−τ ) r
d
εS
+θ(1−τ )r d + (1−θ ) r
d
εS
+ (1−θ )rd ⇒
⇒θ(1−τ ) r l − r d( ) =θ(1−τ ) r
d
εS
+
r l
εK
$
%
&
'
(
)+ (1−θ ) r
d
εS
+
rl
εK
+ rd − rl
$
%
&
'
(
)
−αw2
! "## $###
+
+(1−θτ )αw2 +θ(1−τ )w2 "C (K )⇒
⇒θ(1−τ ) r l − r d( ) =θ(1−τ ) r
d
εS
+
r l
εK
$
%
&
'
(
)+θ(1−τ )w2 "C (K )+θ(1−τ )αw2
 
 ⇒ r l − r d =αw2 +
r d
εS
+
r l
εK
#
$
%
&
'
(+w2 )C (K )>αw2 +
rd
εS
+
rl
εK
#
$
%
&
'
(= rl − rd  (28) 
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Condition (28) tells us that with VAT on financial services, the bank will take into account 
the compliance costs while solving the maximization problem.5 Hence, the prices on deposits 
and loans will change in such a way that the intermediation margin becomes larger than in 
the no-tax case. Larger margins imply that the interest rate on loans increases and/or deposit 
interest rate decreases, i.e. r l ≥ rl  and r d ≤ rd . The first order effect of these price changes 
would be that firms demand less financing from the bank, thus reducing bank’s lending. The 
supply of deposits would also decrease as the result of lower return to households from 
deposits. However, as shown in the next subsection, the changes in loan interest rate will be 
compensated by the input VAT rebates that the firms are entitled to after the exemption is 
lifted. This compensation will “restore” the effective price that the firms pay for capital, thus 
causing no substantial changes in firm’s demand, and hence, bank’s lending. What about the 
bank’s liability side? In the model it is assumed that the interest elasticity of savings is lower 
than one. That means that changes in the interest rate on deposits will have very small effects 
(if any) on the supply of deposits from households, thus leading to no substantial changes on 
the bank’s liability side either.   
 
7.2.2 Firms 
When the VAT exemption of the financial services is lifted, the firms are allowed to claim 
the VAT credit on the purchased inputs.  
Assume that the reference interest rate used by the bank to calculate the value added provided 
to firms and households, is equal to R , such that:  
 r l > R > r d   
Then the share of VAT that was paid by the firm is: 
 τ (r l − R)K   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Since the price elasticities of loans and deposits are assumed to be constant, and the new prices for loans and 
deposits have changed in different directions, I can assume that r
d
εS
+
r l
εK
!
"
#
$
%
& ≈
rd
εS
+
rl
εK
!
"
#
$
%
& . 
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Since the VAT exemption does not longer apply to financial services, then with probability θ  
the firm is allowed to get VAT credit, which is exactly equal to τ (r l − R)K . Hence, in the 
second period the firm will solve the following maximization problem: 
Max
K ,L2
π 2 =θ F(K,L2 )−w2L2 − (1+ r l )K +τ (r l − R)K( )+ (1−θ ) F(K,L2 )−w2L2 − (1+ rl )K( ) =  
               = F(K,L2 )−w2L2 −θ(1+ r l )K +θτ (r l − R)K − (1−θ )(1+ rl )K =  
               = F(K,L2 )−w2L2 +θτ (r
l − R)K − (1−θ )(1+ rl )+θ(1+ r l )( )K =  
               = F(K,L2 )−w2L2 +θτ (r l − R)K − 1+ rl +θ(r l − rl )( )K  
Then in the optimum we have: 
 
€ 
∂F(K,L2)
∂L2
= w2 (29) 
 
∂F(K,L2 )
∂K =1+ r
l +θ(r l − rl )−θτ (r l − R)
 
(30) 
Condition (29) is exactly the same as condition (7), so there will be no changes in the optimal 
allocation of labor, in comparison to the no-VAT case.6 This is a rather expected result, since 
the VAT on financial services had no effect on the price for labor, i.e. the real wage. 
Condition (30), however, has changed relatively to the no-VAT case. As discussed in the 
previous subsection, the input VAT rebates that firms are entitled to after the exemption is 
lifted, allow the bank to set a higher price for loans without distorting firms’ optimal choice 
of capital. For that to hold, we must have the last part of condition (30) equal to zero, i.e.: 
θ(r l − rl )−θτ (r l − R) = 0  
Independently of the size of θ , this last condition will hold if: 
(r l − rl ) = τ (r l − R)⇒ τ = r
l − rl
r l − R <1⇒ R < r
l , where R = 1
τ
rl −1−τ
τ
r l . 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 For simplicity, I assume that labor and capital inputs are technically independent. 
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So the bank should choose the reference rate such that it is smaller than the interest rate on 
loans in the no-VAT case. In particular, if the bank chooses rd ≤ R ≤ rl , then independently 
of the size of θ  firms’ optimal choice of capital will be the same as in the no-VAT case, if 
R = 1
τ
rl −1−τ
τ
r l ≥ rd
⇒ rl − (1−τ )r l ≥ τ rd
⇒ rl −τ rd ≥ (1−τ )r l
⇒ r l ≤ r
l
1−τ −
τ rd
1−τ
 
Hence, the total effect on the amount of capital that the bank will lend to firms is somewhat 
ambiguous. This is because while higher loan rates would normally lead to lower demand 
from firms, recovered VAT on capital inputs would reduce the effective price of loans, thus 
reducing (or even eliminating) the effects from increased loan rates. With the “correct” 
choice of the reference rate and the new loan rate set by the bank, it seems to be possible for 
firms to maintain the same optimal choice of capital as in the no-VAT case.  
 
7.2.3 Households 
When the VAT exemption is lifted, with probability θ  the households will face a new 
interest rate on deposits, namely r d ≤ rd . Then the households’ decision problem will be:  
Max
S,l1,l2
V (S, l1, l2 ) :=θ u(w1(1− l1)+π1 − S, l1)+βu(w2 (1− l2 )+ (1+ r d )S +π 2 +Π, l2 ){ }+
+(1−θ ) u(w1(1− l1)+π1 − S, l1)+βu(w2 (1− l2 )+ (1+ rd )S +π 2 +Π, l2 ){ }  
The solution to this problem is characterized by the following conditions: 
∂u
∂l1
∂u
∂C1
= w1
       
and
        
€ 
∂u
∂l2
∂u
∂C2
= w2,
 
	   39	  
as well as
 
∂u
∂C1
β
∂u
∂C2
−1= rd −θ(rd − r d )< rd
 
The last condition7 tells us that with any positive value of
 
θ  the realized return from saving 
will be smaller than in the no-VAT case. Normally, it would lead to decreased supply of 
deposits from households. However, with the assumption that the interest elasticity of savings 
is less than one, the amount of deposits from households will have no substantial (if any) 
effects from changes in deposit rates (at least in this model). 
 
7.2.4 Market equilibrium 
With the VAT on financial services and the option to tax, the market clearing conditions 
become: 
 
€ 
C1 = F(K0,L1) −
B
α
 (31) 
 
€ 
C2 = F
B
α
,L2
# 
$ 
% 
& 
' 
( (32) 
 
€ 
l1 =1− L1 (33) 
 
€ 
l2 =1− L2 − B −θC
B
α
% 
& 
' 
( 
) 
*  (34) 
 
7.2.5 Social optimum 
The social planner will now solve: 
Max
B,L1,L2
v(B,L1,L2 ) := u F(K0,L1)−
B
α
,1− L1
"
#
$
%
&
'+βu F B
α
,L2
"
#
$
%
&
',1− L2 −B−θC
B
α
"
#
$
%
&
'
"
#
$
%
&
'  
The solution to this problem will be characterized by the following conditions: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 The denominator in the LHS of the last condition (in the required rate of return from saving) is treated here as 
the discounted expected marginal utility of the consumption in the second period. 
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€ 
∂u
∂l1
∂u
∂C1
=
∂F(K0,L1)
∂L1
           
and
           
€ 
∂u
∂l2
∂u
∂C2
=
∂F(K,L2)
∂L2
  
 
−
∂u
∂C1
1
α
+β
∂u
∂C2
∂F(K,L2 )
∂K
1
α
+β
∂u
∂l2
−1−θ "C (K ) 1
α
#
$
%
&
'
(= 0,  
 
Where the last condition can be written as: 
 
 
€ 
∂u
∂C1
β
∂u
∂C2
=
∂F(K,L2)
∂K − α +θ ' C (K)( )
∂F(K,L2)
∂L2
 (35) 
Hence, the difference between the socially optimal allocation and the market allocation with 
VAT on the financial services and the option to tax is: 
 
ΔVAT =
∂F(K,L2 )
∂K − α +θ
#C (K )( )∂F(K,L2 )
∂L2
− (1+ rd −θ(rd − r d )) =
=1+ rl +θ(r l − rl )−θτ (r l − R)− α +θ #C (K )( )w2 − (1+ rd −θ(rd − r d )) =
= rl +θ(r l − rl )−θτ (r l − R)− α +θ #C (K )( )w2 − rd +θrd −θr d =
= (1−θ ) rl − rd( )+θ r l − r d( )−θτ (r l − R)− α +θ #C (K )( )w2
 
(36) 
 Inserting (10) and (28) into (36) gives: 
ΔVAT = (1−θ ) αw2 +
rd
εS
+
rl
εK
#
$
%
&
'
(
#
$
%%
&
'
((+θ αw2 +
r d
εS
+
r l
εK
#
$
%
&
'
(+w2 )C (K )
#
$
%%
&
'
((−θτ (r l − R)− α +θ )C (K )( )w2 =
=
rd
εS
+
rl
εK
#
$
%
&
'
(−θ
rd
εS
+
rl
εK
#
$
%
&
'
(+θ
r d
εS
+
r l
εK
#
$
%
&
'
(−θτ (r l − R)
 
With the assumption that r
d
εS
+
rl
εK
!
"
#
$
%
& ≈
r d
εS
+
r l
εK
!
"
#
$
%
& , we get: 
ΔVAT =
rd
εS
+
rl
εK
"
#
$
%
&
'−θτ (r l − R)< r
d
εS
+
rl
εK
"
#
$
%
&
'= ΔnoVAT , 
because R < r l  by assumption. 
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We see that the marginal welfare loss is reduced by the same amount as the VAT credits that 
the firms receive per unit of purchased capital, multiplied by the probability that the bank will 
opt into taxation. This result is rather intuitive, since applying the VAT on the bank’s services 
eliminates distortions associated with the business use of these services. The production 
efficiency is restored, because the VAT paid on financial services, which are intermediary 
goods in firm’s production process, is compensated (cancelled out) by the VAT credits that 
the firms are now entitled to.  
We can also check whether the deviation between the market allocation and the social 
optimum in the VAT-case becomes smaller in comparison to the no-VAT case, when the 
bank manages to set the “correct” reference rate and the loan rate, so that condition (30) 
becomes ∂F(K,L2 )
∂K =1+ r
l , i.e. θ(r l − rl )−θτ (r l − R) = 0 . In this case we must have: 
!ΔVAT =
∂F(K,L2 )
∂K − α +θ
#C (K )( )∂F(K,L2 )
∂L2
− (1+ rd −θ(rd − r d )) =
=1+ rl − α +θ #C (K )( )w2 − (1+ rd −θ(rd − r d )) =
= rl −αw2 −θ #C (K )w2 − rd +θrd −θr d = rl − rd( )−αw2 −θ #C (K )w2 +θ(rd − r d ) =
=αw2 +
rd
εS
+
rl
εK
$
%
&
'
(
)−αw2 −θ #C (K )w2 +θ(rd − r d ) =
=
rd
εS
+
rl
εK
$
%
&
'
(
)−θ #C (K )w2 − (rd − r d )( )
 
From (28) we know that if r
d
εS
+
rl
εK
!
"
#
$
%
& ≈
r d
εS
+
r l
εK
!
"
#
$
%
& , then !C (K )w2 = r l − r d( )− rl − rd( ) . This 
implies that !C (K )w2 − (rd − r d )( ) > 0 , because rl < r l  by assumption. Hence, we have that: 
!ΔVAT =
rd
εS
+
rl
εK
"
#
$
%
&
'−θ )C (K )w2 − (rd − r d )( ) < r
d
εS
+
rl
εK
"
#
$
%
&
'= ΔnoVAT  
So, we see again that with the VAT on the financial services the market solution to the 
optimization problem is brought closer to the social planner’s solution, i.e. the welfare loss 
measured by the deviation of the market allocation from the social optimum, is reduced. The 
higher θ  is, the smaller is the deviation, and hence, the smaller is the marginal welfare loss. 
For example, if all banks in the economy choose to opt into taxation (in the model, if the 
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probability that the bank will opt in is 100%), then inserting (28) into (36) and setting θ =1
we get: 
ΔVAT = r l − r d( )−τ (r l − R)− α + #C (K )( )w2 =
=αw2 +
r d
εS
+
r l
εK
$
%
&
'
(
)+w2 #C (K )−τ (r l − R)− α + #C (K )( )w2 =
=
r d
εS
+
r l
εK
$
%
&
'
(
)−τ (r l − R)< r
d
εS
+
rl
εK
$
%
&
'
(
)−θτ (r l − R) = ΔVAT ,
 
since τ (r l − R)>θτ (r l − R). 8 
	  
 
7.3 Limitations 
One obvious limitation of the model presented in the previous section is the absence of 
physical capital in the banking sector. The bank uses labor as the only input in production of 
financial services. If the bank were to use physical capital as the production input along with 
labor, then it would have to purchase this input from the firms, and pay VAT on every unit 
purchased (this is, of course, unless the provider of physical capital is not VAT-exempt). 
Then if the bank chose to opt into taxation, it would be allowed to recover the VAT paid on 
capital. So in principle, the model can be extended by adding capital into the banking sector. 
However, this extension will not change the main result, i.e. that imposing VAT on financial 
services brings optimal market allocation closer to the social optimum. 
Another limitation is that the model is restricted to monopolistic banking sector. Indeed, one 
could expect that the analysis might be somewhat different for the fully competitive financial 
sector. The decision to give the bank in the model some market power was based on the fact 
that commercial banking industries in the real world do indeed contain many aspects of 
monopoly and monopolistic competition. Hence, including these aspects in the model ensures 
better approximation to the real world. Moreover, from a social point of view, some market 
power in the banking sector might be desirable. The reason is the importance of banks’ 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Here I continue to assume that r
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charter value that serves as a factor that discourages banks from taking too much risk. The 
model presented in this thesis highlights this role of market power.  
Finally, the model fails to capture the aspects connected to banks’ incentives to opt into 
taxation. This limitation is closely related to the absence of physical capital in the model. In 
my analysis I merely assume that at least fraction  of all the banks will be willing to opt in. 
The question then remains whether  will always be positive, i.e. whether at least one bank 
will be better off opting into taxation of its financial services. This issue is the topic of the 
next section. 
€ 
θ
€ 
θ
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8 Banks’ incentives to opt into taxation 
As it was shown in the previous section, even if a small fraction of banks chooses to opt into 
taxation of their financial services, then the market’s solution to the optimization problem 
will be brought closer to the socially optimal solution. One issue that the model presented in 
this master thesis, does not capture is whether the banks will at all have any economic 
incentives to choose to charge VAT on their services. Feria and Lockwood (op. cit.) examine 
this issue for the case with perfectly competitive financial sector and then for the case when 
there is some market power in the financial sector. In their paper they analyze the costs and 
benefits of the option to tax granted to financial services firms that sell a single homogeneous 
product. They conclude that a financial institution that sells services to tax-exempt customers 
will be always worse off by opting into taxation, both in the case with and without market 
power. Hence, if the customers of a financial firm are mostly represented by households 
sector or VAT-exempted businesses, then such firm will never have economic incentives to 
opt in.  
On the other hand, if a financial institution is mainly engaged in business-to-business 
transactions, then the relative benefits from opting in are much higher than the relative costs 
associated with such option. This result applies to any case, independently of the degree of 
market power in the financial sector. Hence, financial institutions, that mostly supply services 
to VAT-registered customers, will always have strong incentives to opt into taxation.  
Based on the theoretical analysis of Feria and Lockwood (Ibid.), I examine a somewhat 
mixed case, where a financial institution with market power (as in the model presented in this 
master thesis) has both VAT-registered and VAT-exempted customers, and is allowed to opt 
into taxation of its financial services. In my analysis I compare two cases: 
1. The financial institution chooses to opt in; 
2. The financial institution chooses to stay VAT-exempt. 
Consider a monopolistic bank that supplies its financial services to households and 
businesses. It is assumed that the fraction γ  of all bank’s customers is represented by VAT-
registered businesses, while the (1−γ )  share are VAT-exempt households. The bank uses 
labor and physical capital (for example, office equipment, computers, etc.) as inputs in the 
production of financial services. As in the paper by Feria and Lockwood (Ibid.), I assume that 
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one unit of output (a financial service) is produced by one unit of physical capital plus one 
unit of labor.  
First I examine the case when the bank chooses to stay VAT-exempt.  
Let r  be the purchasing price for one unit of output9, while the aggregate demand for 
financial services is represented by the function D(r) , which is decreasing in r . Then we 
must have that households demand financial services in amount equal to (1−γ )D(r) , while 
businesses’ demand for financial services is γD(r) . It is thus assumed that the price for one 
unit of financial services is the same for households and businesses. 
The input prices are q  for one unit of physical capital, and w  for one unit of labor.   
Suppose now that τ  is the VAT rate in this economy. The bank purchases physical capital 
and hires labor to use it in the production of the output, and pays the VAT-inclusive price 
(1+τ )q  per a unit of capital input and w  per unit of labor. Then the bank’s expected profit 
can be written as: 
π B = γ r −w− (1+τ )q( )D(r)+ (1−γ ) r −w− (1+τ )q( )D(r) , 
where the first part of the equation shows the bank’s net revenue from supplying financial 
services to registered businesses, and the second part is the bank’s net revenue from 
households. Since the selling price of financial services is the same for both households and 
businesses, we have that the bank’s expected profit is: 
π B = r −w− (1+τ )q( )D(r)  
If the bank chooses to stay exempt from VAT, then its expected profit will be independent of 
the size of γ . The profit will be always positive, as long as the price of financial services is 
set above their marginal cost, namely: 
€ 
r > w + (1+τ)q  
The question is whether the bank is able to earn higher profits by opting into taxation of its 
services. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Here one unit of output is one unit of any financial service (for example, insurance service, a bank loan, 
investment consulting, etc.) 
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So I look at the case when the bank chooses to opt into taxation. 
If the exemption is lifted, the bank can actually charge its business customers a higher price 
than r , without having losses in businesses’ demand for financial services. This is because 
the option to taxation implies that businesses are allowed to recover VAT paid on the services 
supplied by the bank. Hence, suppose that now the price for financial services offered to 
business customers is equal to: 
R = (1+τ )r  
Taking into account the input VAT credits that businesses are now entitled to, the effective 
price that business customers pay for financial services is equal to R = (1+τ )r −τ r = r , i.e. 
the same as under the exemption. Since the price has remained effectively unchanged, then 
the demand for financial services from businesses also remains unchanged, i.e. D(R) = D(r) . 
Suppose also, that the households are charged the same price for financial services as before, 
namely r .  Then the households’ demand for financial services is equal to (1−γ )D(r) , while 
business customers’ demand for financial services is γD(R) = γD(r) .   
Opting into taxation implies that the bank is allowed to recover the VAT paid on the inputs 
used in the production of financial services. Hence, the bank’s expected profit will be: 
ΠB = γ
R
1+τ −w− (1+τ )q+τq
#
$
%
&
'
(D(r)+ (1−γ ) r1+τ −w− (1+τ )q+τq
#
$
%
&
'
(D(r) , 
where 
€ 
ΠB  is the bank’s expected profit when the bank chooses to opt into taxation, 
€ 
R
1+τ  is 
the VAT-exclusive price of financial services supplied to businesses, and 
€ 
r
1+τ  is the VAT-
exclusive price of financial services supplied to households.10 After opting into taxation the 
bank is entitled to the VAT rebates on inputs used in the production of financial services. 
Hence, the bank recovers γτqD(r)  from supplying its services to businesses, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 As mentioned above, 
€ 
r  is the selling price of financial services supplied to households, i.e. the VAT-
inclusive price. In this model I make the same assumption as in Feria and Lockwood (Ibid.), namely that 
independently of whether the bank chooses to opt into taxation or not, it keeps the selling price of financial 
services to households unchanged. Hence, the VAT-exclusive price is equal to 
€ 
r
1+τ
.  
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(1−γ )τqD(r)  from selling its services to households. Rearranging the terms in the expected 
profit condition and using the assumption that 
€ 
R = (1+τ)r , we get: 
ΠB = γ r −w− q( )D(r)+ (1−γ ) r1+τ −w− q
#
$
%
&
'
(D(r) = r γ + 1−γ1+τ
"
#
$
%
&
'D(r)− w+ q( )D(r)⇒  
⇒ΠB =
1+γτ
1+τ r −w− q
$
%
&
'
(
)D(r)  
In order for the bank to be better off opting into taxation, we must have: ΠB ≥ π B . Hence, 
1+γτ
1+τ r −w− q
"
#
$
%
&
'D(r) ≥ r −w− (1+τ )q( )D(r)
⇒
1+γτ
1+τ r −w− q ≥ r −w− (1+τ )q
⇒
1+γτ
1+τ r − r ≥ q− (1+τ )q
⇒
γ −1
1+τ r ≥ −q⇒ γr ≥ r − (1+τ )q
⇒ γ ≥1− (1+τ )qr
 
So, with the sufficiently high share of business customers, namely with γ ≥1− (1+τ )qr , the 
bank will be better off if it chooses to opt into taxation of its financial services. 
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9 Taxation of financial services in Norway 
In Norway, as in many other countries with VAT, a wide range of financial services is VAT 
exempt. It is recognized that the main reason for the exemption is technical complexity in 
identifying the value added for each specific transaction in the financial sector, as well as 
difficulties in defining the “correct” value added on margin-based financial services (NOU 
2014: 13).  
Nevertheless, Norway, as many other countries, is currently working on designing such a tax 
on financial services, which would both raise as few technical difficulties as possible, and 
retain most of the properties of the value added tax. In particular, two most favorable 
characteristics of the VAT are pointed out in Proposition No. 1 LS (2013-2014) to the 
Storting, namely neutrality of the tax with respect to domestic and foreign suppliers of 
financial services and input VAT rebates for business customers (Norwegian Ministry of 
Finance, op. cit.). 
The Proposition suggested that normal VAT should be charged on financial services supplied 
in return for specific consideration (fixed fees, commissions, etc.), whereas margin-based 
financial services should be subject to another form of taxation, which would have as many 
properties of the VAT as possible. VAT registered businesses would be allowed to recover 
the VAT on financial services sold in return for specific consideration. At the same time, the 
suppliers of such services (financial institutions) would be able to recover VAT paid on 
inputs used in the production of such services. The Proposition emphasized that both types of 
financial services should be taxed at a same rate, whereas financial services provided for use 
abroad should be zero-rated, as such services are part of Norwegian export (Ibid.). 
The main difference between the proposed tax on margin-based financial services and the 
VAT is that the former would apply to aggregate margin income (not separately on each 
transaction). This means that tax calculations would be performed, for example, once a year. 
Then if a financial institution pays taxes on both income from margin-based financial 
services and income from the services sold in return for fixed fees and commissions, then 
such institution should be entitled to full input VAT deductibility (Ibid.). 
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Finally, the Proposition suggested that the tax on margin-based financial services should only 
apply to not VAT registered customers (mainly households). This means that financial 
services supplied to businesses (VAT registered) should be zero-rated (Ibid.).   
On the 2.December 2014 a new proposition on taxation of financial services has been 
presented by the Scheel Committee, cf. the NOU 2014: 13 Capital income taxation in an 
international economy (Chapter 9 Taxation of the financial sector). In general, the Committee 
expressed similar views as in the Proposition No. 1 LS (2013-2014). In particular, it was 
pointed out that the Ministry of Finance should continue working on the tax design for the 
financial sector. Moreover, the tax on margin-based financial services should be designed in 
such a way that it in the least possible way leads to distortions of the preferences between 
consumption and saving. This implies that: 
1. Such tax should be introduced gradually; 
2. The tax should retain the neutrality properties of the VAT; 
3. The tax rate on margin-based financial services should not necessarily be the same as the 
VAT rate (It is possible that financial institutions’ margin income should be taxed at a 
lower rate than the VAT rate).  
The Committee emphasized that such tax should be introduced in the shortest possible time, 
even if it fails to retain most of the properties of the VAT in the short run. On this last point, 
the Committee believes that the distortions caused by the VAT exemption of the financial 
sector are much more severe, than the ones caused by non-neutrality of the tax on margin-
based financial services, at least in the short run (NOU 2014: 13). 
The Committee recognizes that the difference in the tax rates might lead to decrease in use of 
the services sold in return to a specific consideration, as well as increased margins. Therefore, 
it is preferable that all types of goods and services are subject to the same tax rate. However, 
if closer examination shows that it is difficult for financial institutions to replace fixed paid 
services by margin-based financial services, then different tax rates might be considered 
(Ibid.). 
Finally, in order to be able to introduce the tax on financial services in shortest possible time, 
the Committee suggests that the new tax model should initially not distinguish between VAT 
registered and not VAT registered customers, i.e. the new tax model should be as easy to 
design as possible (Ibid.). 
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10 Conclusion 
Over the last decades taxation of financial services has been one of the most intensely 
debated topics in the tax literature. A wide range of financial services in many countries is 
VAT exempt. The exemption seems to be generally perceived as undesirable, as it causes a 
number of important economic distortions and violates the neutrality of the VAT system. At 
the same time, imposing the VAT on financial services is associated with a number of 
technical and administrative issues, which no country so far has managed to solve. There is 
also a number of theoretical arguments in favor of the VAT exemption of the financial sector. 
The main objective of this thesis has been to investigate the economic effects of imposing the 
VAT on financial services. In particular, I compared two cases: with and without VAT on 
financial services, using the latter as a benchmark for the analysis.  
I have set up and solved a two-period consumption/investment model, where a monopolistic 
bank supplies intermediation services between borrowers (firms) and lenders (households). 
As possible solutions to the issue of technical and administrative complexity of taxation of 
financial services, I used both cash-flow taxation and option to tax in the model.  In 
particular, I have shown that in the benchmark case (the situation where there is no VAT on 
financial services) the market solution to the optimization problem leads to a marginal 
welfare loss, measured by the deviation of the market solution from the social optimum. 
Applying the VAT on margin-based financial services, which in the model are represented by 
the intermediation services between borrowers and lenders, brings the market allocation 
closer to the socially optimal allocation, thus reducing the marginal welfare loss in the 
economy. This becomes possible due to the input VAT rebates that the firms are entitled to 
when the exemption is lifted. The marginal welfare loss will always be smaller when the 
VAT is imposed, as long as the probability of opting in is positive. It has been also shown 
that the higher is the probability that the bank will opt into taxation the larger is the reduction 
in the marginal welfare loss.  
The model presented in the thesis has some limitations. First of all, there is no physical 
capital in the banking sector. Incorporating physical capital as one of the inputs that the bank 
uses in the production of its services could be one way to extend the presented model. Then it 
would be possible to include the input VAT rebates that the bank receives when the 
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exemption is lifted, into the analysis. This would also allow us to examine bank’s incentives 
to opt into taxation within the model. Though incorporating physical capital into the model 
would add some interesting points into analysis, it would not change the main result, namely 
that imposing the VAT on financial services reduces the deviation between the market 
allocation and the social optimum. Another limitation is that the model is restricted to 
monopolistic banking sector. And though introducing fully competitive financial sector might 
somewhat change the results of the analysis performed in the thesis, giving the bank in the 
model some market power makes better approximation to the real world, as well as might be 
desirable from the social point of view. 
Finally, I examined bank’s incentives to opt into taxation by setting up another model, where 
it has been shown that a bank, whose customers are mainly VAT registered businesses, will 
always be better off opting into taxation. The opposite would apply to a bank, whose 
customers are mainly not VAT registered consumers (for example, households). Hence, it has 
been concluded that with a sufficiently high share of VAT registered customers, a bank will 
have incentives to choose to charge the tax on its services. 
In the final part of the thesis I presented a short overview of the latest proposals on taxation 
of financial services in Norway. These proposals differ in some details from the tax policy 
introduced in this thesis, but have one common idea with the thesis: financial services should 
be subject to the VAT or any other form of taxation that manages to retain as many properties 
of the VAT as possible. 
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